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Victims’ Right to a Speedy Trial:  
Shortcomings, Improvements, and  
Alternatives to Legislative Protection 
Mary Beth Ricke  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Academy Award, BAFTA Award, Critic’s Choice Award, Golden 
Globe Award, SAG Award, and Grammy Award winner Jennifer 
Hudson is widely known as an actress, singer, and spokesperson after 
being a finalist in the 2002 television hit American Idol.
1
 However, 
despite her fame and successful entertainment career, Hudson is not 
immune to tragedy. In October 2008, Hudson’s mother, brother, and 
seven-year-old nephew were murdered in Chicago.
2
 The alleged 
killer is William Balfour, the estranged husband of Hudson’s sister.3 
The murders occurred in October 2008, Balfour was indicted in 
December 2008 with his first court appearance in January 2009, and 
while the trial was scheduled to begin in February 2012, it was 
delayed until April 2012.
4
 Among other charges, the defendant was 
finally found guilty on all three counts of murder in May 2012, with 
 
  J.D. Candidate (2013), Washington University School of Law; B.A. (2010), Rhodes 
College. I would like to thank Catherine Vannier and the Missouri Office of Prosecution 
Services, and all of the editors on the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy.  
 1. Biography for Jennifer Hudson, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm1617685/bio 
(last visited Dec. 24, 2012). Winners! A Complete List from the 2009 Grammys, E! ONLINE, 
http://www.eonline.com/news/98902/winners-a-complete-list-from-the-2009-grammys (last visited 
Dec. 24, 2012).  
 2. Jennifer Hudson’s Family Murder Trial: Alleged Killer’s Lawyers Want to Talk to 
Star, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 8, 2012, 10:55 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/ 
08/jennifer-hudsons-family-m_n_1262437.html.  
 3. Id.  
 4. Caitlin Fry, Jennifer Hudson’s Murder Trail [sic] is Further Delayed, RUNNING LIP 
(Jan. 19, 2012, 10:56 PM), http://runninglip.com/celebrity/2012/01/jennifer-hudsons-family-
murder-trail-is-further-delayed/.  
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an appeal assured to be filed.
5
 An emotional Jennifer Hudson served 
as the first witness for the prosecution seeking justice for her 
murdered family members.
6
 
While the family members of victims suffer from delays in the 
trials of alleged offenders, the victims themselves often suffer as 
well. A burglar broke into the home of an eighty-six-year-old woman, 
brutally raped and beat her, and left behind a traumatized victim and 
his own DNA.
7
 The defendant, Richard L. Newberry, was charged 
with these crimes as his DNA matched the DNA left at the crime 
scene.
8
 However, the case against Newberry was not resolved for 
three years due to twelve trial delays.
9
 The defendant was not 
 
 5. Alex Perez, Jennifer Hudson Family Murder Trial: Guilty on All Counts, ABC NEWS 
(May 11, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/jennifer-hudson-family-murder-trial-guilty-counts/ 
story?id=16312497#.UEptP3ZO_DY. The defendant was also found guilty on additional counts 
of home invasion, burglary, kidnapping, and possession of a stolen vehicle.  
 6. Monica Davey, Actress Takes Stand at Trial in the Killings of Relatives, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 23, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/us/jennifer-hudson-testifies-
for-prosecution-at-murder-trial.html.  
 7. Stephanie Smith, Rules Add to Trials of Victims Prosecution Delays Cause 
Frustrations, SUN SENTINEL (Oct. 11, 1992), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1992-10-11/news/ 
9201260724_1_crime-victims-victim-services-coordinator-speedy-trial.  
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. The following demonstrates the delays in this case of the rape of the 86-year-old 
victim: 
November 11, 1989: Defendant is charged with sexual battery with force or injury, 
burglary with assault or battery and robbery.  
December 21, 1989: Set for a plea conference. Defendant turned down a plea bargain, 
and the case is set for trial on March 6, 1990.  
March 2, 1990: The defense is granted a continuance and the trial is postponed to May 
21, 1990.  
May 18, 1990: Defense again asks for a continuance, and the trial is reset for Sept. 4, 
1990.  
August 31, 1990: Defense asks for continuance, reset for December 10, 1990. 
December 7, 1990: Defense asks for continuance, reset for February 19, 1991. 
February 15, 1991: Defense asks for continuance, reset for March 25, 1991. 
March 25, 1991: Case reset by the judge to May 13, 1991. 
May 7, 1991: Trial postponed by the judge to July 1, 1991.  
July 1, 1991: Case transferred to another judge. 
October 10, 1991: Case passed over for another jury trial. 
December 3, 1991: Trial set for Feb. 3, 1991. 
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convicted; rather, the charges were dropped.
10
 The trial seeking 
justice for the rape victim was deemed “pointless” because the 
defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment resulting from his 
crimes in another case.
11
 The victim, eighty-nine years old at the time 
the case was resolved, responded with, “I think it took quite a long 
time. It took three years. That seems long, doesn’t it?”12 The sources 
of the delays were mainly continuances requested by the defendant 
several days before the trial was scheduled to begin and 
postponements made by the judge.
13
  
A common problem in the prosecution of crimes against victims is 
that the trial is typically delayed through scheduling conflicts, 
continuances, and other unexpected delays throughout the course of 
the trial.
14
 Victims of the crimes are already heightened emotionally 
with anxiety and anticipation of the impending trial, and these delays 
lead to further and unnecessary trauma.
15
 Several states include 
victims’ bills of rights in their constitutions or enact statutes in an 
attempt to acknowledge and protect a victim’s interest in a speedy 
trial.
16
 Other states have done the same, but for only a specified class 
of victims, particularly child victims.
17
 
While more states should enact similar legislation or include a 
similar bill of rights in their constitutions, the problem with these 
existing bills of rights and statutes is that they are under-utilized and 
go largely unnoticed.
18
 This Note proposes that these statutes and 
bills of rights should be used more frequently and be given more 
authority for several reasons. First, the four-factor test determining if 
 
Jan. 27, 1992: Case passed over for another trial. Trial reset for April 13, 1992. 
April 10, 1992: State drops charges because Newberry is convicted in the rape of 
another elderly woman and sentenced to life in prison. 
The newspaper’s source is cited as the Clerk of Courts. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.  
 13. Smith, supra note 7.  
 14. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. See also infra note 100 and accompanying 
text.  
 15. See infra notes 97–103 and accompanying text.  
 16. See infra notes 59–63 and accompanying text.  
 17. See infra notes 70–90 and accompanying text.  
 18. See infra notes 105–11 and 117 and accompanying text.  
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a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated is also relevant 
in determining if the victim’s right to a speedy trial has been violated. 
In other words, the interests of the defendant and victim in having a 
speedy trial may sometimes overlap, thus suggesting that the victim’s 
right to a speedy trial should be held in high regard and held with 
great importance as well. Second, many studies demonstrate the 
negative effects of prolonging the trial on the victim and on his or her 
ability to cope and heal from the trauma.
19
 Finally, there are practical 
aspects to the integrity of the judicial process that are affected when a 
trial is prolonged unnecessarily. This Note proposes alternative 
means to achieve the desired result when the victims’ bills of rights 
and statutes fail or fall short, principally through the use of victim 
advocates and counselors.  
Part II of this Note examines the Sixth Amendment right 
defendants have to a speedy trial, the evolution of the test in 
determining if a violation of this right has occurred, and a discussion 
of the current four-factor test. Part II then discusses the states where 
victims’ bills of rights and victims’ rights statutes have been enacted, 
focusing on the State of Arizona and the victims’ bill of rights 
enacted there. Part II also discusses the legislative intent and purpose 
behind the Arizona bill of rights and explains how the bill of rights 
was applied and analyzed in a Supreme Court case. Part III critiques 
the current use of victims’ bills of rights and argues why the 
utilization must be more widespread. It then discusses alternative 
ways to reach the purpose behind victims’ bills of rights—
particularly the right to a speedy trial—through other means. 
II. HISTORY  
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
20
 
guarantees criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial. It is applied 
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
21
 In determining if a violation of the defendant’s right to 
 
 19. See infra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. 
 20. The relevant portion of the Sixth Amendment states, “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .” U.S CONST. amend. VI. 
 21. The relevant section of the Fourteenth Amendment states:  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol41/iss1/9
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a speedy trial has occurred, there is no set formula,
22
 and the Court 
has struggled to define the balancing test currently used.
23
 
The Supreme Court rejected the proposed solution that the 
defendant must be afforded a trial within a specific time period in 
order to comply with the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.24 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit defined a rule 
that the Government must be prepared for trial within six months of 
the defendant’s arrest or the charge would be dismissed absent 
unusual circumstances.
25
 The Supreme Court refused to adopt this 
approach because “such a result would require this Court to engage in 
legislative or rulemaking activity, rather than in the adjudicative 
process to which we should confine our efforts.”26 The Court found 
no basis in the Constitution that the right to a speedy trial may be 
“quantified into a specified number of days or months.”27  
Another approach rejected by the Supreme Court would require 
that an accused demand a speedy trial in order for a court to even 
begin to analyze the potential violation of the right, termed the 
 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.  
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 22. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972) where Justice Powell, in delivering 
the opinion of the Court, states,  
[T]he right to speedy trial is a more vague concept than other procedural rights. It is, 
for example, impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied. 
We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to 
be swift but deliberate. As a consequence, there is no fixed point in the criminal 
process when the State can put the defendant to the choice of either exercising or 
waiving the right to a speedy trial. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 23. See infra notes 24–31 and accompanying text. 
 24. Barker, 407 U.S. at 523.  
 25. Id. (citing Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases 
(1971)). 
 26. 407 U.S. at 523. Justice Powell also stated that the states are “free to prescribe a 
reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards, but our approach must be less 
precise.” Id. 
 27. Id.  
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“demand-waiver doctrine.”28 The Court faulted this approach because 
the presumption of a fundamental right’s waiver from simple inaction 
is inconsistent with the Court’s assertions on these types of waivers.29 
The Court further faulted this approach because the State brings the 
defendant to trial and therefore the State possesses the duty to ensure 
the trial is “consistent with due process.”30 With these considerations, 
the Court rejected the notion that if the defendant fails to demand a 
speedy trial he or she waives his or her right, but it still declared that 
the defendant’s assertion of the right or failure to assert the right to a 
speedy trial is a factor in determining if there is a deprivation of the 
constitutional right.
31
 
In rejecting these two rigid approaches to determining if the 
constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, the Court 
adopted a more flexible balancing test with multiple factors in Barker 
v. Wingo.
32
 These four factors include the “[l]ength of delay, the 
reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and 
prejudice to the defendant.”33 
In assessing the first factor of length of the delay, the Court 
indicated that the type of crime and surrounding circumstances 
influence the permissible length of the delay.
34
 The second factor of 
reason for the delay logically dictates that the prosecution may not 
use a delay to gain an advantage over the defendant or harass the 
defendant, while a valid reason, such as a missing witness, would 
 
 28. 407 U.S. at 523–25. The Court defined the demand-waiver doctrine as providing that 
“a defendant waives any consideration of his right to a speedy trial for any period prior to which 
he has not demanded a trial. Under this rigid approach, a prior demand is a necessary condition 
to the consideration of the speedy trial right.” Id. at 525. 
 29. 407 U.S. at 525–26. These pronouncements on waiver of constitutional rights include 
a definition of a waiver as “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 
privilege” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)); “Courts should ‘indulge 
every reasonable presumption against waiver’” (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 
389, 393 (1937)); and “they should ‘not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental 
rights’” (quoting Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)). Id. 
 30. 407 U.S. at 527. The Court also cites Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543, 551 (8th 
Cir. 1969) for its assertion that the responsibility for the expeditious trial of criminal cases is 
not solely on the defendant. Id. at 527 n.27. 
 31. 407 U.S. at 528–29. 
 32. Id. at 530. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 530–31. The Court gave the example that the delay tolerable for an “ordinary 
street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.” Id. at 531.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol41/iss1/9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013]  Victims’ Right to a Speedy Trial 187 
 
 
justify the delay.
35
 Furthermore, a “more neutral reason such as 
negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily” 
against the government.
36
 However, it is still an important 
consideration because the government possesses the ultimate 
responsibility to ensure the defendant is not burdened by a delay.
37
 In 
describing the third factor of the defendant’s assertion of his right, the 
Court emphasized that “failure to assert the right will make it difficult 
for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.”38  
The fourth factor of prejudice to the defendant is the most 
complex of the inquiries. The Court articulated the three central 
interests the defendant’s right to a speedy trial seeks to protect: “(i) to 
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and 
concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the 
defense will be impaired.”39 The Court was concerned with the 
impact on the lives of defendants awaiting trial, be it loss of job, 
disruption of family life, or idleness.
40
 Furthermore, the Court was 
perhaps even more concerned with the ability of the defendant to 
present a defense, reasoning that a jailed defendant is “hindered in his 
ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his 
defense.”41 Finally, the Court recognized that the defendant in a 
criminal trial is often disadvantaged by the aura of anxiety, suspicion, 
and hostility.
42
 Courts must consider these three interests of the 
defendant in determining if the defendant has been prejudiced by the 
delay and then carefully balance the remaining three factors to 
ascertain if there is a deprivation of the defendant’s right to a speedy 
trial.  
 
 35. Id. See also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325 (1971); Polland v. United 
States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957). 
 36. 407 U.S. at 531. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 532. 
 39. Id. The Court cites to United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966), and Smith v. 
Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377–78 (1969) in identifying these three interests.  
 40. 407 U.S. at 532 (citing TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE, TO INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, 
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF 
VIOLENCE 152 (1969)). 
 41. 407 U.S. at 533. 
 42. Id. 
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In Barker, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals that the defendant was not deprived 
of his due process right to a speedy trial.
43
 While the delay between 
arrest and trial was well over five years for no legitimate reason, the 
Court found the prejudice to the defendant to be minimal because the 
defendant’s witnesses remained available.44 Additionally, the 
defendant did not want a speedy trial and instead strived to take 
advantage of the delay.
45
 The Court’s method of balancing the four 
factors in this case is an illustration of how the factors must be 
considered together to determine if a violation of the right to a speedy 
trial exists.
46
  
While the United States Constitution clearly protects the criminal 
defendant’s right to a speedy trial, the federal government and many 
states have enacted legislation to protect the interests victims have in 
a speedy trial, particularly child victims.
47
 The Crime Victim’s Rights 
Act
48
 states that, among other rights, crime victims have “[t]he right 
to full and timely restitution as provided in law”49 and “[t]he right to 
proceedings free from unreasonable delay.”50 This statute was first 
introduced in 2004 with the intent to protect crime victims’ rights.51 
In applying this statute to a case in which there was a parties’ joint 
waiver of speedy trial time, a New York court held that the 
consideration of whether the waiver would result in an unreasonable 
delay warranted notification to the victims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3771(a)(7).
52
 Thus, the court acknowledged the victims’ interest in 
being informed of the potential delay in the trial resulting from the 
 
 43. Id. at 536. 
 44. Id. at 534. 
 45. Id. at 534–36. 
 46. This four-factor test continues to be the inquiry determining if the defendant’s right to 
a speedy trial has been violated. See 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 948 (2011). 
 47. See infra notes 48–50, 53–54, 59–63, 65, 70–90 and accompanying text. 
 48. Crime Victims’ Rights, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2009). 
 49. § 3771(a)(6). 
 50. § 3771(a)(7). 
 51. Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260. 
 52. United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). The judge stated that 
in granting the waiver, he “did so without the benefit of any victim input . . . conclud[ing] that 
the brief period of delay the parties proposed—35 days—would not unduly delay the 
proceedings and was otherwise warranted in the interest of justice.” Id. at 336.  
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decision of both the prosecution and defense to waive the speedy trial 
time.  
The statute defending child victims’ and child witnesses’ rights53 
provides further legal protection for victims under the age of eighteen 
who are or are alleged to be a victim of a crime of “physical abuse, 
sexual abuse, or exploitation” or “a witness to a crime committed 
against another person.”54 Among many other rights protected, the 
statute mandates that courts must ensure a speedy trial in specially 
designated cases involving child victims and witnesses to minimize 
the stress of the children involved with the trial.
55
 This consideration 
also applies when a court considers whether or not to grant a 
continuance.
56
 This statute was first introduced as a part of the Crime 
Control Act of 1990 with the purpose to “control crime.”57 Courts 
have held that allowing the prioritization of proceedings involving 
children providing testimony over all other proceedings does not 
violate defendants’ right to adequately prepare for trial.58  
Along with the federal statutes, many states also have enacted 
statutes protecting victims generally or child victims specifically.
59
 
 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2009).  
 54. § 3509(a)(2)(A)–(B). 
 55. § 3509(j). The relevant portion of the statute states: 
In a proceeding in which a child is called to give testimony, on motion by the attorney 
for the Government or a guardian ad litem, or on its own motion, the court may 
designate the case as being of special public importance. In cases so designated, the 
court shall, consistent with these rules, expedite the proceeding and ensure that it takes 
precedence over any other. The court shall ensure a speedy trial in order to minimize 
the length of time the child must endure the stress of involvement with the criminal 
process. When deciding whether to grant a continuance, the court shall take into 
consideration the age of the child and the potential adverse impact the delay may have 
on the child's well-being. The court shall make written findings of fact and conclusions 
of law when granting a continuance in cases involving a child.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990). 
 58. E.g., United States v. Broussard, 767 F. Supp. 1536 (D. Or. 1991).  
 59. See Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n, Speedy Trial Statutes in Cases Involving Child 
Victims and Witnesses, http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NCPCA%20Speedy%20Trial%202011.pdf 
(last updated May 2011).  
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Arizona,
60
 Tennessee,
61
 Vermont,
62
 and Utah
63
 have implemented 
constitutional amendments or statutes pertaining to the general 
interest of all victims in a speedy trial, thus guaranteeing that all 
 
 60. Arizona has a victims’ bill of rights. ARIZ. CONST. ART. II, § 2.1 (2012). The relevant 
portion of the victims’ bill of rights states:  
(A) To preserve and protect victims’ rights to justice and due process, a victim of 
crime has a right . . . 
(10) To a speedy trial or disposition and prompt and final conclusion of the case 
after the conviction and sentence. . .  
(C) “Victim” means a person against whom the criminal offense has been committed 
or, if the person is killed or incapacitated, the person’s spouse, parent, child or other 
lawful representative, except if the person is in custody for an offense or is the 
accused.  
Id. 
 61. In Tennessee, victims’ rights are also constitutionally protected. TENN. CONST. ART. I, 
§ 35 (2012). The relevant provisions state: 
To preserve and protect the rights of victims of crime to justice and due process, 
victims shall be entitled to the following basic rights . . . 
6. The right to a speedy trial or disposition and a prompt and final conclusion of 
the case after the conviction or sentence . . . 
The general assembly has the authority to enact substantive and procedural laws to 
define, implement, preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to victims by this 
section.  
Id. 
 62. In Vermont, victims’ interest in a speedy trial is protected by statute. VT. STAT. ANN. 
TIT. 13, § 5312 (2012). The statute states: 
(a) The prosecutor’s office shall make every effort to inform a victim of a listed crime 
of any pending motion that may substantially delay any deposition, change of plea, 
trial, sentencing hearing, or restitution hearing. The prosecutor shall inform the court 
of how the victim was notified and the victim’s position on the motion, if any. In the 
event the victim was not notified, the prosecutor shall inform the court why 
notification did not take place.  
(b) If a victim of a listed crime objects to a delay, the court shall consider the victim’s 
objection. 
Id. 
 63. In Utah, the rights of victims are codified in a bill of rights. UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 
§ 77-37-3 (West 2012). The relevant parts of the statute state,  
(1) The bill of rights for victims and witnesses is . . . 
(h) Victims and witnesses, particularly children, should have a speedy disposition 
of the entire criminal justice process. All involved public agencies shall establish 
policies and procedures to encourage speedy disposition of criminal cases.  
Id. 
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victims of crimes should be granted a speedy trial. The language of 
the legislation and constitutional amendments are very similar, 
protecting the interest of victims in the speedy dispositions of trials, 
and some of the legislation allocates authority to certain state actors.
64
 
Missouri has also enacted a statute protecting rights of victims,
65
 but 
the protections are limited to victims of dangerous felonies,
66
 victims 
of murder in the first degree,
67
 victims of voluntary manslaughter,
68
 
and victims of an attempt to commit one of the preceding crimes.
69
 
States appear to be more willing to enact legislation and 
constitutional amendments protecting the interests of children and 
other particular special victims and witnesses in a speedy trial. States 
that have enacted such legislation include: Alabama,
70
 Arkansas,
71
 
California,
72
 Delaware,
73
 the District of Columbia,
74
 Florida,
75
 
Idaho,
76
 Illinois,
77
 Kentucky,
78
 Massachusetts,
79
 Michigan,
80
 
Missouri,
81
 Nebraska,
82
 Nevada,
83
 New Hampshire,
84
 New Jersey,
85
 
 
 64. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.  
 65. MO. REV. STAT. § 595.209(1)(16) (2012).  
 66. Victims of dangerous felonies are defined in section 556.061 of the Missouri Revised 
Statutes. MO. REV. STAT. § 556.061 (2012). 
 67. Murder in the first degree as defined by section 565.020 of the Missouri Revised 
Statutes. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (2012). 
 68. Voluntary manslaughter as defined in section 565.023 of the Missouri Revised 
Statutes. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.023 (2012). 
 69. An attempt to commit one of the preceding crimes is defined in section 564.011 of the 
Missouri Revised Statutes. MO. REV. STAT. § 564.011 (2012). 
 70. ALA. CODE 1975 § 15-25-6 (2012). 
 71. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-80-102 (2012).  
 72. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1048 (West 2012).  
 73. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9404 (2012). 
 74. D.C. CODE § 23-1903(d) (2012).  
 75. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.0155 (West 2012). 
 76. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-110 (2012).  
 77. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/114-4(k) (2012).  
 78. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.510 (West 2012). 
 79. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16F (2012). 
 80. MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 780.759 (2012). 
 81. MO. REV. STAT. § 491.710 (2012). 
 82. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1925 (2012). 
 83. Nevada has enacted two statutes protecting the interests of child witnesses and victims 
in a speedy trial. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 174.515(3), 174.519 (2011). 
 84. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:9 (2012). 
 85. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:163-5 (West 2011).  
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New York,
86
 North Dakota,
87
 Oregon,
88
 Rhode Island,
89
 and 
Washington.
90
  
The states with the laws most protective of victims’ right to a 
speedy trial are Tennessee and Arizona.
91
 In these states, victims to 
all crimes are provided with their own bills of rights to be enforced 
by the states.
92
 In Arizona, the legislature clearly and unequivocally 
dictated its legislative intent and the purpose of the bill of rights for 
the victims of crimes.
93
 The Arizona legislature “recognize[d] that 
many innocent persons suffer economic loss and personal injury or 
death as a result of criminal acts,” and it is thus the intent of the 
Legislature to ensure that “article II, section 2.1, Constitution of 
Arizona, is fully and fairly implemented and that all crime victims are 
provided with basic rights of respect, protection, participation and 
healing of their ordeals” and that “employees of this state and its 
political subdivisions who engage in the detention, investigation, 
prosecution and adjudication of crime use reasonable efforts to see 
that crime victims are accorded the rights established by article II, 
section 2.1, Constitution of Arizona.”94 As victims’ right to a speedy 
trial is included in this section of the Arizona Constitution, the 
legislature directly states its intention is to ensure that this right 
enables victims to heal more quickly and that it is the responsibility 
of the employees of the state of Arizona to enforce this right to a 
speedy trial.
95
 This idea is further reflected in the purpose of the 
victims’ bill of rights because, in the direct words of the legislature, 
“before passage of the victims’ bill of rights, victims had no 
assertable right to a speedy and prompt resolution or to a prompt and 
final conclusion of a case after the conviction and sentence.”96 Thus, 
 
 86. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 642-a (McKinney 2012).  
 87. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-35-05 (2011). 
 88. OR. REV. STAT. § 44.545 (2012). 
 89. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-11.2 (2012). 
 90. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.46.085 (2012). 
 91. See supra notes 60 and 61 and accompanying text.  
 92. See supra notes 60 and 61.  
 93. Victims’ Rights Implementation Act, 1991 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 229, § 2; Act Relating 
to Victims’ Rights, 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 290, § 13. 
 94. 1991 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 229, §§ 2(2), 2(4).  
 95. 1991 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 229, § 2; 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 290, § 13.  
 96. 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws , ch. 290, § 13(B).  
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it is clear the Arizona Legislature intended to guarantee crime victims 
certain rights, such as the right to a speedy trial, because of the effect 
the crime has on a victim, and a prolonged trial delays the healing 
process for the victim.  
There are multiple studies supporting this conclusion of the 
Arizona Legislature, demonstrating the negative effect on a victim’s 
healing process when there is a prolonged trial of the alleged attacker 
because the actual judicial process is a burden on the victim. 
According to the National Center for Victims of Crime, survivors of 
crime will experience a variety of emotional responses, described as 
“crisis reaction.”97 Many victims of violent personal assaults suffer 
from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), resulting in anxiety 
attacks, flashbacks, and living in constant fear.
98
 Studies indicate that 
PTSD levels are high among victims and their families who had high 
exposure to the criminal justice system, and that victims of sexual 
assault, aggravated assault, and family members of homicide victims 
are the most likely to develop PTSD.
99
 
Researchers state that while PTSD symptoms in victims gradually 
diminish and fortunately sometimes disappear, the crisis reaction and 
its symptoms may be triggered by a victim’s participation in a trial, 
as “[t]he process of a trial can be very traumatic for the victim” and 
“may add more pain to an already painful process.”100 In other words, 
the delay of the trial increases the risk that PTSD symptoms will 
reappear in the victim, thus impeding the victim’s recovery from the 
violent action taken against him or her.  
Studies also indicate that prolonged trials hinder the judicial 
process in other ways. Research indicates that many rapes and crimes 
of a sexual nature remain unreported; specifically, only 12.9 percent 
 
 97. The Trauma of Victimization, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME (2008), http://www 
.victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crime-victims/trauma-of-victim 
ization. 
 98. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (4th ed. 2000).  
 99. See Posttraumatic Stress, DARKNESS TO LIGHT (1995), http://oldsite.d2l.org/Know 
About/articles_pstraumatic_stress.asp?showstaticmenu=1 (citing Kilpatrick, Dean & Ritchie 
Tidwell, Victims' Rights and Services in South Carolina: The Dream, the Law, the Reality 
(Crime Victims Research & Treatment Ctr., Medical Univ. S.C. 1989)). 
 100. T. Allen Gore, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, MEDSCAPE REFERENCE, http://emed 
icine.medscape.com/article/288154-overview (last updated Apr. 25, 2012). 
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of men and 19.1 percent of women who were raped reported the 
crime to the police.
101
 This can be explained by the fear of having to 
undergo the excruciating, long process before trial and having to face 
the attacker at trial. Particularly in prosecutions where the victim of 
the crime is a child, recantation is frequent because the child victim’s 
caregivers do not wish to proceed with the prosecution for fear of 
traumatizing the child even further.
102
  
A final class of victims to these crimes consists of the family 
members of victims to the crimes, even though they were not harmed 
physically. For example, 23.4 percent of surviving family members 
of homicide victims will develop PSTD.
103
 The relatives of the eleven 
women killed by an alleged serial killer in Cleveland are currently 
petitioning the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s office to accept the 
guilty pleas of defendant Anthony Sowell in exchange for life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole so they do not have to 
“endure a trial” because “a prolonged trial and re-enactment of 
Sowell’s demented actions will create great distress on the families of 
victims.”104  
With the legislative intent and purpose of the Arizona victims’ bill 
of rights against this backdrop of research, it is next important to 
explore how this bill of rights has been utilized and interpreted. The 
first thing to note is that not many cases cite the right to a speedy trial 
provision of the victims’ bill of rights, thus implying it is 
underutilized.
105
 In State v. Dixon, this provision was a factor in the 
 
 101. Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE VICTIMIZATION: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN SURVEY 33 (2006), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/210346.pdf. 
 102. See Tamara E. Hurst, Prevention of Recantations of Child Sexual Abuse Allegations, 
2(11) CENTER PIECE 1, 2–3 (2010), available at http://www.ncptc.org/vertical/Sites/%7B8634 
A6E1-FAD2-4381-9C0D-5DC7E93C9410%7D/uploads/%7BEDA13E5A-2350-408C-B673-34C 
AEB3FD7E7%7D.PDF. 
 103. Dean G. Kilpatrick, Angelynne Amick & Heidi S. Resnick, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
THE IMPACT OF HOMICIDE ON SURVIVING FAMILY MEMBERS (1990), available at https://www 
.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/130823NCJRS.pdf. 
 104. Charles Montaldo, Victims Relatives Want ‘House of Horrors’ Plea Deal, 
ABOUT.COM (June 9, 2011), http://crime.about.com/b/2011/06/09/victims-relatives-want-house-
of-horrors-plea-deal.htm. 
 105. For example, in Arizona, the state with the most protective legislation for victims, 
very few cases cite the victim’s bill of rights, thus demonstrating that Arizona courts rarely 
consider the victims’ bill of rights in deciding a case. See infra notes 106–14 for discussion of 
the rare cases citing this provision.  
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trial court judge’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion for a 
continuance, which Dixon argued on appeal was an abuse of 
discretion.
106
 The defendant was convicted in a jury trial of first-
degree murder of a twenty-one-year-old college student on January 6, 
1978.
107
 The victim was strangled with a belt and stabbed several 
times, with the attacker’s DNA left on her body and on her 
underwear.
108
 The police were unable to match this DNA with a 
suspect until 2001, when police matched the DNA with the defendant 
through a national database.
109
 The defendant was arraigned in 
January 2003 and after multiple continuances filed by the defendant, 
the trial began on November 13, 2007: twenty-nine years after the 
victim’s murder, six years after matching the defendant’s DNA to the 
DNA found on the victim’s body, and four years after the defendant’s 
arraignment.
110
 The parents of the victims, also considered victims, 
 
 106. State v. Dixon, 250 P.3d 1174, 1183–84 (Ariz. 2011).  
 107. Id. at 1177–78.  
 108. Id. at 1177.  
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 1183–84. The following details in the court’s opinion provide further insight 
into the circumstances surrounding the motions for continuances filed by the defendant: 
Dixon was arraigned in January 2003; the State filed a notice of intent to seek the 
death penalty in March of that year. In July 2003, defense counsel suggested that it 
might take longer than usual to compile mitigation evidence because Dixon spent his 
early life on the Navajo reservation. After counsel stated that the mitigation specialist 
would need “a year,” the judge set the trial date for June 15, 2004. Over the next few 
years, the court repeatedly granted defense requests to continue the trial. In April 2004, 
the public defender estimated that if a new specialist were assigned, the mitigation 
investigation could be completed in five months. The court granted a defense motion 
for a continuance and vacated the June trial date. After the case was reassigned to a 
new specialist, the deadline for disclosure of mitigation evidence was accordingly 
extended to January 2005. That deadline was not met, and after Dixon was granted 
permission to represent himself in March 2006, the trial date was set for October 18, 
2006. In September 2006, however, Dixon estimated that his mitigation evidence 
would not be ready for “nine months or a year.” The court continued the trial to June 
25, 2007, “a date certain.” In May 2007, however, Dixon told the court his mitigation 
was still not ready and sought another continuance. The trial was reset for August 
2007. Two months later, Dixon requested another continuance. Although he expressed 
frustration, the judge reset the trial date for September 13, 2007. At a subsequent 
hearing, the trial date was moved back to November 13, 2007. A week before trial was 
scheduled to begin, Dixon asked for a three-month continuance. The court denied the 
motion, noting in a minute entry that “[t]he defense mitigation work-up in this case has 
been ongoing for well over four years.” Dixon claims that the court erred in denying 
this last continuance request.  
Id.  
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repeatedly asserted the right to a speedy trial throughout the 
defendant’s multiple requests for continuances, and the Arizona 
Supreme Court ruled that “the superior court did not abuse its 
discretion, after granting numerous continuances, in finally honoring 
their request that the trial proceed.”111 
The Arizona Supreme Court, in analyzing the superior court’s 
decision to deny the defendant’s motion for continuance, further 
stated,  
A continuance of any trial date shall be granted only upon a 
showing that extraordinary circumstances exist and that delay 
is indispensable to the interests of justice. A continuance may 
be granted only for so long as is necessary to serve the interests 
of justice. In ruling on a motion for continuance, the court shall 
consider the rights of the defendant and any victim to a speedy 
disposition of the case.
112
 
Arizona courts have also stated that the court “must consider the 
defendant’s right in conjunction with a victim’s constitutional right to 
a speedy trial and the trial court’s prerogative to control its own 
docket.”113 However, Arizona courts have also made it clear that a 
defendant’s federal constitutional rights outweigh a victim’s state 
constitutional rights if they directly conflict.
114
 Accordingly, it is the 
trial judge’s responsibility to balance these rights and implement the 
legislative intent of the Arizona legislature.
115
 
 
 111. Id. at 1184.  
 112. Id.  
 113. State v. Evans, No. 1 CA–CR 09–0162 2010, 2010 WL 4969031, at * 4 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2010) (quoting State v. Lamar, 72 P.3d 831, 836–37 (Ariz. 2003)).  
 114. P.M. v. Gould, 136 P.3d 223, 227–28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v. Riggs, 942 
P.2d 1159, 1162 (Ariz. 1997)).  
A defendant's rights may also conflict with a victim's rights. It is well-accepted that “if, 
in a given case, the victim's state constitutional rights conflict with a defendant's 
federal constitutional rights to due process and effective cross-examination, the 
victim's rights must yield.” State v. Riggs, 189 Ariz. 327, 330, 942 P.2d 1159, 1162 
(1997), citing Roper, 172 Ariz. at 236, 836 P.2d at 449.  
Id.  
 115. State v. Thompson, No. LC2004-000076-001 DT, 2004 WL 2607771, at *2 (Ariz. 
Super. Ct. 2004).  
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III. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL  
As the development of the interpretation of the defendant’s 
constitutional right to a speedy trial demonstrates, the interpretation 
of laws protecting victims’ right to a speedy trial is similarly 
complicated, and it is also limited to only a few jurisdictions.
116
 
Arizona has few cases interpreting the state constitutional protection 
for victims, and in Tennessee, the other state with a similar 
constitutional protection, there is only one case interpreting the 
protection, which concerns pretrial hearings.
117
 
The four factors courts use to weigh the right of the defendant to a 
speedy trial also apply to victims’ interest in a speedy trial.118 First, 
victims also have an interest in the length of delay. The victim of rape 
at age eighty-six was forced to witness the charges against her 
attacker dropped after three years, and she had an interest in the 
length of the trial as it affected her ability to receive some sort of 
closure.
119
 The family of the victim in the Dixon case also had an 
interest in the length of the trial, especially given the fact that the 
crime against their daughter occurred twenty-nine years before 
arraignment.
120
  
Second, the reason for the delay is used to determine if a victim’s 
right to a speedy trial has been violated. For example, in Dixon, the 
Supreme Court of Arizona explained that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a continuance 
because, among other things, the reason the defendant gave for a 
 
 116. See supra notes 47–90 and accompanying text.  
 117. State v. Layman, 214 S.W.3d 442 (Tenn. 2007). In interpreting the victims’ bill of 
rights, the court stated:  
The State also argues that the trial court impermissibly allowed the [victim’s] family to 
direct the prosecution of the case by permitting their attorney to participate in the 
hearing. We agree. The “right to confer” as defined by the General Assembly does not 
allow victims or their attorneys to appear before the court and offer legal arguments in 
opposition to those of the prosecutor. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-38-114(c). We conclude 
that the participation of the Powers [victim’s] attorney in the pretrial hearing exceeded 
the right to confer granted to victims under the Tennessee Constitution. 
Id. at 454.  
 118. See supra notes 33–46 and accompanying text. 
 119. See supra notes 7–13 and accompanying text.  
 120. See supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text.  
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continuance was to develop more mitigating evidence, which was 
never substantially used.
121
 In other words, the defendant may not 
manipulate the court system in an attempt to delay the trial for an 
unfair reason.
122
  
Third, courts may and do look to the victim’s or the victim’s 
family’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial as courts look to the 
defendant’s assertion. This again occurred in the Dixon trial, as the 
court highlighted the fact that the victim’s parents “repeatedly 
asserted that right [the victim’s right to a speedy trial].”123 It is 
necessary for victims or families of victims to assert this right 
through the prosecutors, which differs from the method utilized by 
defendants: when they assert their right to a speedy trial, defendants 
assert the right through their attorneys as the client. However, the 
“client” of the prosecutor is the State and not the victim or the 
victim’s family. Therefore, because no attorney directly represents 
the victim or the victim’s family in a criminal prosecution, the courts 
and legislatures must take affirmative steps to protect the interest of 
victims in a speedy trial.  
Fourth, just as in assessing the prejudice to the defendant in order 
to determine whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated, 
courts may also analyze the three factors to determine the level of 
prejudice to the victim. These three factors include the interests in: 
(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing 
anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility 
 
 121. Dixon, 250 P.3d at 1184.  
 122. See Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009) (holding the delays caused by public 
defenders could not be counted against the State when the defendant claimed his Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated and that in determining if a violation had 
occurred, the court must take into account the disruptive behavior of the defendant). 
Throughout Brillon’s nearly three-year trial for felony domestic assault and habitual offender 
charges, he employed many antics prolonging the trial and at least six attorneys were assigned 
to him. Id. at 1287–90. In weighing these delays against the defendant because of his actions, 
the Court warned against the incentives the defendant may have to “employ delay as a ‘defense 
tactic’: delay may ‘work to the accused advantage’ because ‘witnesses may become unavailable 
or their memories may fade’ over time.” Id. at 1290 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 
(1972)). Not only does this case remove the incentive for the defendant to manipulate the court 
system in an attempt to cause the case to be dismissed for the lack of a speedy trial, but it also 
acknowledges the fact that the delay of a trial may negatively impact the prosecution by causing 
witnesses to become unavailable or have faded memories. 
 123. Dixon, 250 P.3d at 1184. 
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that the defense will be impaired.
124
 The first factor does not directly 
apply to the victims’ interest in a speedy trial, while the second and 
third factors do directly apply. Anxiety and concern during the course 
of the trial directly affect the victims: anxiety about their testimonies, 
anxiety about the end of the trials, anxiety about moving on with their 
lives, and anxiety about whether the accused will be convicted and 
therefore unable to harm them again.
125
 These fears are directly 
reflected in the PTSD symptoms many victims are inflicted with, 
which are then enhanced by delays and the participation in a trial.
126
 
Additionally, delays in the prosecution of the victims’ alleged 
attacker might also negatively impact prosecution.
127
 For example, 
child victims and witnesses are more likely to recant, witnesses for 
the prosecution may no longer be available, and the victims may 
become restless and therefore less willing to cooperate.
128
 
Consequently, the factors the courts use in determining if a defendant 
has been denied the constitutional right to a speedy trial are also 
relevant and may be used in determining if the victim has also been 
denied the right to a speedy trial.
129
  
When the defendant’s right and victim’s right to a speedy trial 
conflict with each other, the defendant’s federal constitutional right to 
due process will always trump the victim’s state constitutional 
right.
130
 The remedy is also different; when the court determines the 
defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, the conviction 
may be overturned.
131
 However, when a court determines that a 
 
 124. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.  
 125. See supra notes 97–104 and accompanying text.  
 126. See supra notes 97–104 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra note 122 and accompanying text concerning Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 
1283 (2009). See also supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.  
 128. See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.  
 129. See supra notes 118–28 and accompanying text.  
 130. See supra note 114 and accompanying text concerning P.M. v. Gould, 136 P.3d 223 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Evans, No. 1 CA-CR 09-0162 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2010); 
State v. Thompson, LC2004-000076-001 DT (Ariz. Super. Ct. Sept. 2, 2004).  
 131. See United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1977) (reversing the conviction of 
the defendant because of the violation of the right to a speedy trial). The court stated: 
While we think, on the whole, that the showing of prejudice here is not particularly 
strong, we believe that the other three factors enumerated in Barker lean generally 
against the government. The delay was a patently long one and it was largely 
chargeable to the government. Even if we were to disregard the time during which a 
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victim’s right to a speedy trial is violated, the court may deny the 
defendant’s request to a continuance, and higher courts will use this 
analysis to deny the defendant’s appeal of abuse in discretion in 
denying the continuance.
132
 Both inquiries (if there has been a 
violation of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial and if there has 
been a violation of the victim’s right to a speedy trial) involve a great 
deal of discretion for the trial judge and the higher courts. 
In the states with statutes or bills of rights protecting the victims’ 
right to a speedy trial, the fact that there are so few cases citing this 
authority is telling: either judges and prosecutors are unaware of it, or 
there is barely any authority behind the statutes or bills of rights. The 
same can be said of states with a victims’ bill of rights for certain 
victims only.
133
 While courts are willing to acknowledge general 
rights of victims, they are less willing to make significant decisions in 
protecting the acknowledged right to a speedy trial victims 
supposedly have.
134
 
 
mutually agreeable termination of the case remained a possibility, much of the delay 
occurred after the defendant had forthrightly begun to assert his right to a speedy trial. 
Yet, despite the fact that these three factors favor appellant, we would hesitate without 
an additional factor to conclude only on the basis of the factors set forth in Barker that 
Carini was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. What tips the scales in 
appellant's favor is the conceded violation of the Speedy Trial Act resulting from the 
failure to have Carini's trial commence by December 27, 1976. Although the deadline 
was exceeded by only thirty-one days, the resulting violation of the Act, which might 
otherwise seem inconsequential, assumes much greater importance when those thirty-
one days are viewed against the pre-existing background of protracted delay directly or 
constructively chargeable to the government. The violation of the Act was clearly 
foreseen, yet, despite the significant prior delays and Carini's timely invocation of his 
Sixth Amendment rights, the violation was permitted to occur. 
Id. at 151–52 (emphasis added).  
 132. See supra notes 106–12, 121, and 123 and accompanying text describing Dixon.  
 133. Take Missouri as an example. See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text. In 
interpreting the victims’ and witnesses’ rights statute, Missouri courts have acknowledged these 
rights in general. See State v. Allen, 274 S.W.3d 514 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (holding the trial 
court correctly allowed the robbery victims to be present at all pre-trial hearings given the 
“strong language” of the statute); Sharp v. State, 908 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding 
the state did not breach the plea agreement to remain silent on the defendant’s sentence for 
involuntary manslaughter and second-degree assault when the victim requested maximum 
sentence); State v. Woltering, 810 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (holding the prosecutor’s 
statements during closing arguments about the murder victim’s rights were not improperly 
prejudicial against the defendant). The specific right of the victims to a speedy trial and 
disposition in the trial of their alleged abuser has not been specifically addressed.  
 134. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.  
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As the Arizona legislative intent and purpose states in explaining 
the Arizona victims’ bill of rights,135 the whole purpose behind a 
victims’ bill of rights and statutes describing these rights is to make 
the process easier for victims to ensure they may heal or start to heal 
more quickly.
136
 A key obstacle to this is that sometimes the victim’s 
right to a speedy trial directly conflicts with the defendant’s right to a 
speedy trial, and as the defendant’s right is a federal right to due 
process, the defendant’s right will always trump the victim’s.137 
There is also the problem that many victims and the families of 
victims are unaware of their right to a speedy trial in jurisdictions 
with these provisions.
138
 As victims are rarely represented by their 
own attorneys, a victim is more likely to become confused with the 
judicial process, thus further hindering the goals and purpose behind 
a victims’ bill of rights.139 Therefore, different approaches must be 
taken in order to achieve the goals of the purpose of the victims’ bill 
of rights.  
There are ways prosecutors and other state workers can help 
victims and victims’ families through the painful process leading up 
to the trial and the trial itself, thus making the job of prosecuting the 
defendant easier. If the trauma inflicted on the victim is addressed 
early through the use of victim advocates, the “severity of the 
victim’s reactions may be eased, and the risk of developing PTSD is 
diminished.”140 These victim advocates are crucial to the criminal 
justice process, and they must be utilized.
141
 While some 
continuances may be unavoidable, cases of domestic violence, sexual 
assault, child abuse, homicide, and any case involving a victim of 
 
 135. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text describing the legislative intent of the 
Arizona statute.  
 137. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.  
 138. As an attorney does not directly represent the victim or the family of the victim 
because the prosecutor represents the State, the victim and family members do not have an 
attorney looking out for their interests exclusively. Therefore, it is unlikely they will be aware 
of their rights even if the state has enacted legislative protections. 
 139. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.  
 140. N.Y.C. ALLIANCE AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT, Factsheets: Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder, available at http://www.svfreenyc.org/survivors_factsheet_41.html (internal citations 
omitted). 
 141. See generally THE NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, available at http://www.vic 
timsofcrime.org/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).  
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violent crime must be given high priority in the interest of the victim 
and efficiency of the prosecution. Additionally, when the defendant 
seeks a continuance, prosecutors should emphasize to the judge the 
adverse effect the delay will have on the victim. In jurisdictions 
where there is a victims’ bill of rights or statute providing the same 
protection, the prosecutor must bring this to the judge’s attention. 
Even in jurisdictions providing limited rights to victims or no rights 
at all, prosecutors should still become familiar with the legislation in 
other jurisdictions and present it to the judge. If continuances become 
necessary, the court and prosecutor should make every effort to 
decrease the amount of delay caused to the case.  
Additionally, prosecutors can also be responsible for causing 
delays in seeking continuances, sometimes unnecessarily. In making 
the decision to seek a continuance, prosecutors should consider the 
potentially negative impact the continuance would have on the victim 
and potentially the case. Prosecutors also have an interest in a speedy 
trial from a purely practical aspect. As they bear the burden to 
establish that the defendant committed the crime against the victim 
beyond a reasonable doubt, prosecutors need to prosecute the case 
while the evidence is still fresh and the witnesses are still available 
with a clear recollection of detail regarding the crime. While 
advocates for defendants’ right to a speedy trial point to delayed trials 
impeding helpful witnesses for the defense from testifying, the same 
may be said about delays increasing the possibility that witnesses for 
the prosecution will no longer be available. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
Despite the imperfections of a victims’ bill of rights and a right to 
speedy trial statute, more states should adopt the bill of rights to their 
state constitutions or enact legislation acknowledging the interest 
victims have in the speedy disposition of the trial. As studies 
indicate,
142
 the entire judicial process is extremely grueling on a 
victim and a victim’s family, thus hindering the judicial process and 
creating greater costs to society. The Arizona victims’ bill of rights is 
a great state-level model because it is extensive, the legislative intent 
 
 142. See supra notes 97–104 and accompanying text.  
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is clear, and there are several cases interpreting the meaning and 
scope of victims’ rights.143 The Dixon case is a great demonstration of 
the need for awareness of the victim’s right to a speedy trial; not only 
was the defendant arraigned twenty-nine years after the victim was 
murdered, but it was also four years until the defendant was 
convicted after arraignment and then nine years after arraignment 
when the defendant’s conviction was affirmed by the Arizona 
Supreme Court.
144
 Despite the problems with this victims’ rights 
legislation, at the very least it is an acknowledgement of the pain and 
trauma the victims have endured, and this acknowledgement, if 
recognized by the victim, can be very significant to the victim.  
 
 143. See supra notes 60 and 96 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text.  
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